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COMMENT 
 
ABSTRACT  In social studies of technology, as in many other scientific disciplines, highly 
persuasive similes are at work: pious stories, seemingly reaped from research, suggesting 
certain general theoretical insights.  Variously adapted, they are handed down: in the process, 
they acquire almost doctrinal unassailability.  One such parable, which has been retold in 
technology and urban studies for a long time, is the story of Robert Moses’ low bridges, 
preventing the poor and the black of New York from gaining access to Long Island resorts and 
beaches.  The story turns out to be counterfactual, but even if a small myth is disenchanted, it 
serves a purpose: to resituate positions in the old debate about the control of social processes via 
buildings and other technical artifacts - or, more generally, about material form and social 
content. 
 
Do Politics Have Artefacts? 
 
Bernward Joerges 
 
A few years ago, a former student assistant of mine proudly published, in the 
foremost German sociology journal, his first article.1  It was all about the social nature 
of technical norms and, to underline his central argument, he cited at the end a story 
from Langdon Winner’s paper, ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?’:2 
 
 Winner tells us about the Autobahn bridges over the highways leading from 
New York City to the beaches of Long Island.  Robert Moses, a famous New 
York architect, had designed these bridges in the thirties and in doing so had 
made certain that the New Yorkers had no other possibilities of reaching the 
beaches but on just these highways.  Winner noticed that these bridges are built 
very low, and that only automobiles could pass under them.  Public buses, on 
the other hand, cannot pass.  Having grown suspicious, Winner took a closer 
interest in Moses and his bridges.  The situation was soon cleared up: Moses 
had intentionally had his bridges built so low to keep typical users of public 
transport, at that time the poorer strata of the population and especially blacks, 
away from the beaches and to reserve these for the white middle classes.  
Decades after Moses’ death, the resentments of a singular person are then 
incorporated in his bridges as an ongoing social injustice ...3 
 
Readers of this journal may have heard this story (or a similar one) before: towards 
the end of this Comment, they will see that it can be told differently. 
 
Winner’s Version 
 
In ‘Do Artifacts have Politics?’, Winner answers the question as to whether material 
technical artifacts are intrinsically political with a resounding: ‘Yes, they are!’.  His 
basic thesis is as follows: tangible artifacts, including the built environment and other 
                                                 
1  Gerald Wagner, ‘Vertrauen in Technik’ (Trust in Technology), Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 
Vol. 23, No. 1 (April 1994), 145-57 [trans. BJ]. 
2  Langdon Winner, ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?’, Daedalus, Vol. 109, No. 1 (Winter 1980), 121-
36. 
3  Wagner, op. cit. note 1, 155. 
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material-spatial arrangements, embody „social’ (that is, ‘power’) relations.  If this is 
so, the problem arises of how to build ‘material’ (in the sense of ‘causally explicable’) 
processes into action (and other social) theories.  And a moral issue also arises: what 
kind of material objects should one make and accept?  Because in deciding to have (or, 
as Winner says, ‘live in’) specific material artifacts, we ipso facto take a political 
decision.  For example, we cannot decide to have nuclear plants and at the same time 
preserve democratic social forms.  Winner uses the philosopher’s ‘we’ here, of course, 
which includes the author, then his readers, and then the rest of humankind as 
represented by him.  His argument is, as he repeatedly says, about the ‘larger 
questions about technology and the human condition’. 
 
 This is Winner’s programme, or doctrine.  Carefully distinguishing several 
versions, he initially focuses on one particular variant, which I will call the ‘strong’ or 
design-version of ‘artifacts-have-politics’.4  In the design-version, someone wills a 
specific social state, and then suitably transfers this intention into an artifact.  
Architects, for instance, may want people to communicate, and can then design their 
office buildings accordingly.  The people who use them will then communicate all the 
time, an enduring social relationship has been built into the artifact.  The only 
immediately plausible empirical case Winner adduces for this strong, design-version 
are the low bridges of Robert Moses. 
 
 Robert Moses: legendary political entrepreneur, who has shaped the physical 
form of New York in this century and beyond as no other person, and on the way has 
become the big bogey man of urban studies.  Winner introduces the bridge example 
with the observation that certain details of form in bridges, streets and roads are 
habitually taken to be meaningless, and yet... 
 
 ... it turns out ... that some two hundred or so low-hanging overpasses on Long 
Island are there for a reason.  They were deliberately designed and built the 
way by someone who wanted to achieve a particular social effect.  Robert 
Moses, the master builder of roads, parks, bridges, and other public works of 
the 1920s to the 1970s in New York, built his overpasses according to 
specifications that would discourage the presence of buses on his parkways.5 
 
Moses, Winner argues, was a racially prejudiced member of the upper classes who 
incorporated his politics in those parkway overpasses.  His artifacts are meant to 
discriminate the poor and the black population of New York: bridge-building is social 
engineering, because power relations can literally be built into and perpetuated 
through stone. 
                                                 
4  Later on, Winner discusses at length technological modes beyond the design mode, where 
specific technologies require social forms: ‘inherently political technologies’ (op. cit. note 2, 
128) are graded along the two axes of ‘strict requirement versus strong compatibility’ with 
social relations and conditions ‘internal versus external’ to the workings of a given 
technology.  The combination of ‘strictly required’ and ‘internally located’ social relations 
produces inherently powerful artifacts, as in nuclear energy. 
5  Winner, op. cit. note 2, 123.  And he continues, generalizing to the construction of 
relationships of social inclusion/exclusion at large: ‘Many of Moses’ monumental 
structures of concrete and steel embody a systematic social inequality, a way of 
engineering relations among people that, after a time, becomes just another part of the 
landscape’. 
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 Besides the Moses example for the strong, design-version, Winner offers many 
other plausible examples for softer versions of the power of artifacts to fixate social 
relationships.  And indeed, a soft technological determinism somehow accords better 
with common sense.  The fact that one must build a wall if one wants to prevent 
others from passing through does not tend to excite important controversies in any 
sociology of technology and architecture.  Objectors would just come away with a 
bleeding head. 
 
 Or is it so simple?   Readers might reflect on the potential interpretive 
flexibility of a proverbial figure of speech involving the notion of a ‘building’ (a 
‘wall’), before we go on to discuss the interpretive flexibility of the bridge parable.  
Let the statement ‘with your head through a wall’ go through your head, and you 
may indeed find it less plausible.  What should count as a wall?  What if one is armed 
with a tank?  What is one to do with less literal meanings of the statement?  And so 
on...  There is plenty of interpretive flexibility as to deterministic and indeterministic 
treatments of the relations between head and wall.6 
 
 But Winner has not much use for such semantic games.  In his paper ‘Upon 
Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty’, he clearly states that he finds them 
quite frivolous, in the face of an historical situation where technological systems 
inexorably grow more precarious and life-threatening.7  In a serious stance, he 
engages the political and moral implications of modern technology.  No playing 
around, with this author, with the poetic aspect of atomic reactors, or the usefulness 
of roses as deadly weapons, as demonstrated by Keith Grint and Steve Woolgar.8  
Winner seems not to be concerned, to borrow a famous title, ‘how to do things with 
words’.  He seems concerned with ‘how to do things with things’. 
 
Chinese Whispers 
 
‘Do Artifacts have Politics?’ was published in 1980 in Daedalus, in an issue dedicated 
to the state-of-the-art in social studies of technology.  The paper had - and, as one can 
see, continues to have - considerable success.  The bridge-example, in particular, has 
been cited innumerable times.  I say ‘innumerable’, because the count offered by the 
Social Science Citation Index is quite meaningless.  Searching the SSCI for the article 
(and the book in which it was reprinted),9 in 1998, produced a count of 151 citations.  
Everyone who knows his or her own count will agree that this is quite impressive.  
                                                 
6  In German, head and wall (Kopf und Wand) rhymes nicely with the venerable metaphor of 
Kopf und Hand (head and hand). 
7  Langdon Winner, ‘Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty: Social 
Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology’. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 
Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 1993), 362-78. 
8  See Keith Grint and Steve Woolgar, ‘Computers, Guns and Roses: What’s Social about 
Being Shot?’, Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1992), 366-80.  
Steve Woolgar is, of course, one of the main defendants in Winner’s trial of social 
constructivism. 
9  Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 
1986), 19-39.  Another version (from which many authors quote) appeared in Donald 
MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (eds), The Social Shaping of Technology (Milton Keynes, 
Bucks. & Philadelphia, PA: The Open University Press, 1985), 26-38.  
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And yet it does not say much.  In contrast to the experimental sciences (and 
economics), monographs and edited books remain the major form of publication in 
the human sciences.  Since the SSCI covers only journals, its count hardly offers a fair 
estimate of the reach of a text, as measured by citation frequency.  Langdon Winner 
himself has told me that the Daedalus article was quoted in almost every technology-
related book on his shelves.10 
 
 The Moses story is also a particularly nice case of Chinese Whispers:11 one 
author whispers a line into the ear of the next, and in the end a quite different one 
comes out.12  Interesting simplifications, adaptations, even reversals occur.  In the 
version I quoted at the beginning, for example, Moses turns into an architect, the 
bridges are built in the thirties, the height of the bridges becomes a technical norm, the 
parkways mutate to Autobahnen, the Autobahnen are the sole access roads to Long 
Island beaches, Moses died many decades ago, the person who discovers the wrong 
height of the bridges becomes Langdon Winner.  None of these points is to be found in 
Winner’s text, but all can be traced in the texts of participants in these Chinese 
Whispers.13 
 
 More instructive then such displacements are the ways in which particular 
authors appropriate the bridge story for their own purposes, whether or not they 
argue for Winner’s implied thesis.14  But rather than reconstructing in more detail the 
career of Winner’s anecdote, I shall briefly exemplify its reappropriation with two 
stages in the Chinese Whispers, illustrated by the work of two authors: Bruno Latour 
and Steve Woolgar, erstwhile co-authors of that study, Laboratory Life, whose 
aftershocks can still be felt in social studies of science and technology.15 
 
 Latour has referred to ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?’ to enhance one of his own 
paradigmatic stories, that of the automatic door closer: 
                                                 
10  Remark made in an interview (Sigtuna, Sweden, 6 December 1994). 
11  Or, as the children’s game is called in German, ‘Stille Post’. 
12  An important source for many could have been the often-quoted introductory essay to the 
volume edited by Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (op. cit. note 9), esp. 7.  Here 
Winner’s Moses-interpretation appears in the first few pages (and is appropriated for the 
argument against technological determinism). 
13  Other texts in which Winner’s parable is drawn on in the affirmative include, for example: 
Ilana Löwy, ‘The Legislation of Things (Essay Review)’, Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science, Vol. 28, No. 3 (September 1997), 533-43, at 534-35, where the Moses quote is 
without further referencing attributed to Andrew Feenberg, Alternative Modernity: The 
Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1995) and to Mary Tiles and Hans Oberdieck, Living in a Technological Culture: Human Tools 
and Human Values (London: Routledge, 1995); John Law and Annemarie Mol, ‘Notes on 
Materiality and Sociality’, The Sociological Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 (May 1995), 274-94, at 280-
81; Bernward Joerges, ‘Technology in Everyday Life: Conceptual Queries’, Journal for the 
Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol. 18, No. 2 (June 1988), 219-37, at 235 (n.7); Donald MacKenzie, 
‘Marx and the Machine’, Technology and Culture, Vol. 25, No. 3 (July 1984), 473-502, at 500; 
and many others.  No doubt readers have their own lists... 
14  As, for instance, in Bryan Pfaffenberger, ‘Technological Dramas’, Science, Technology, & 
Human Values, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1992), 282-312, at 294. 
15  Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979; Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, rev edn, 1986). 
 
 
5 
 
 To use the classic Langdon Winner’s motto (1980), because of their descriptions 
these doors discriminate against very little and very old persons ... they 
discriminate against furniture removers and in general everyone with 
packages, which usually means, in our late capitalist society, working or lower-
middle class employees (who, even coming from a higher strata, has not been 
cornered by an automated butler when he or she had their hands full of 
packages?).16 
 
Similar to Winner, Latour seems to point here to discrimination via things: ‘how to do 
things with things’.  Artifacts somehow are political.  With Latour, however, this is 
not ‘political’ in the sense of a definitive political order.  The aspect of intention and 
design - so central in Winner’s strong programme - does not interest Latour much 
here.  Much as Winner does, Latour takes things seriously: but he dissolves or 
reverses Winner’s causal nexus.  In contrast to Winner, Latour assumes a high degree 
of contingency: the power of things depends on how they are (as Latour says) 
‘syntagmatically’ networked with other things, in competition with paradigmatic 
counter-programmes of differently coupled actants.  The power of things does not lie 
in themselves.  It lies in their associations; it is the product of the way they are put 
together and distributed.  Accordingly, Latour’s reference to Winner is slightly 
mocking: he allows automatic doors to discriminate against millionaires, provided 
they are coupled with boxes, much as Moses’ bridges discriminate (of course) against 
luxury buses. 
 
 In Steve Woolgar’s equally influential paper ‘The Turn to Technology in Social 
Studies of Science’,17 Woolgar attacks Winner, and speculates about the attractiveness 
of stories like the one of Moses’ bridges: 
 
 Ironically, the appeal of these stories lies in part in the display of a ‘rational’ 
connection between the revealed (that is, constructed) consequences.  More 
important, however, is the dependence of these stories on definitive accounts 
of the outcome of the technology.  Despite the argument that the outcome or 
impact of technologies is contentious, that it is highly problematic to nominate 
one or other effect as arising from technology per se rather than from other 
social ‘factors,’ each of these stories unproblematically nominates the outcome 
(effects) of a technology.18 
 
Woolgar’s criticism here is that Winner claims as a definitive effect (racial 
discrimination for keeping Jones Beach clean) ‘what might elsewhere be treated ... as 
essentially contingent and contestable versions of the capacity of various technologies 
... [which] from the point of view of a broad constructivist commitment ... are clearly 
part of the phenomena to be investigated’.19  Here ‘contingent’ presumably means 
                                                 
16  Jim Johnson aka Bruno Latour, ‘Mixing Humans and Non-Humans Together: The 
Sociology of a Door-Closer’, Social Problems, Vol. 35, No. 3 (June 1988), 298-310, at 302 
(emphasis in original). 
17  Steve Woolgar, ‘The Turn to Technology in Social Studies of Science’, Science, Technology, & 
Human Values, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1991), 20-50. 
18  Ibid., 34 (emphasis in original). 
19  Ibid., 35. 
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‘dependent on the motives and interest of those who may tell the story’ (although, in 
reading Woolgar, a continental author can never be so sure).  This is an entirely 
different argument from Latour’s.  Woolgar’s contingency concerns interpretations of 
the bridges in literary texts, not associations of the bridges in action programmes.  In 
Woolgar’s view, Winner fails to take into consideration versions of the Moses-story 
which he (Winner) might favour although, from a constructivist point of view, 
Winner’s story clearly is part of the phenomenon under study.  Different authors, says 
Woolgar, could tell the Moses-story quite differently.  One must also take into 
consideration these other versions, in which for some reason other effects are posited 
as definitive.  And so on and so on, in a never-ending semiosis.  Indeed, it is said that 
now and then a bus has tried to negotiate (with) one of Moses’ low bridges, with the 
definitive effect that he or she ended up like an opened tin of sardines.20 
 
 Woolgar himself does not look into other versions of the story.  But the exercise 
of Chinese Whispers proves him right so far.  The Chinese Whispers process, with its 
more or less productive misinterpretations, shows that an endless series of variants of 
Moses’ bridges exists.  Authors who have taken up Winner’s tale tend to re-tell the 
story somewhat differently, declaring other definitive effects, and using the story for 
the explication of broad classes of technological effects privileged in their own 
theories. 
 
 This is why one should follow Woolgar here, albeit with a difference.  Woolgar 
and his followers in social studies of technology tend to deny the material level of 
technology.  They get caught completely in the whispers, as it were: they somehow 
avoid referring to a world outside the multilingual murmurs.  To talk about tangible 
bridges and buses tends to become the same as to talk about texts which talk about 
bridges and buses.  They talk, at best, about ‘how to do things with words’, exactly not 
about ‘how to do things with things’.  And then comes the talking about the talking of 
texts that talk about bridges and buses.  The preferred rhetorical stance is the 
ironical.21 
 
 The fundamental hermeneutic suspicion that something might be wrong with 
Winner’s story has grown on me for a while.  Could it be that all this was a bit 
different?  Winner presents his example like a concrete historical event.  But he is not 
too much concerned with Moses history or New York history.  He leaves out all the 
details that make for the interest of an historical text.  He aims at a general lesson, a 
more theoretical lesson (on the way that material artifacts embody social relations), 
and a moral lesson (on how, as a consequence, using such artifacts must be accounted 
for).  In order to deliver these lessons, he translates a highly detailed historical 
                                                 
20  Robert Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 1974), 938. 
21  In a little controversy around Winner’s black-box article (in which the bridges turn up 
again, of course), Marc Elam, Langdon Winner, Trevor Pinch and Steve Woolgar have it 
out in various ventriloquist guises.  In the end, Woolgar is pleased at having persuaded 
Winner that in the last analysis it all comes down to rhetoric tout court: see Trevor Pinch, 
‘Turn, Turn, and Turn Again: The Woolgar Formula’, Science, Technology, & Human Values, 
Vol. 18, No. 4 (Autumn 1993), 511-22; Steve Woolgar, ‘What’s at Stake in the Sociology of 
Technology? A Reply to Pinch and to Winner’, ibid., 523-29; Mark Elam, ‘Anti 
Anticonstructivism or Laying the Fears of a Langdon Winner to Rest, ibid., Vol. 19, No. 1 
(Winter 1994), 101-06; Langdon Winner, ‘Reply to Mark Elam’, ibid., 107-09. 
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episode into a highly successful parable: a pious tale in which analogies are drawn 
between specific instances and human behaviour at large.22 
 
Robert Caro’s Version 
 
From where in these Chinese Whispers does Winner take his tale from life?  He finds 
it in Robert Caro’s monumental biography of Moses, The Power Broker.23  There Caro 
indeed recounts the design-version,24 and bases it on two interviews, one with 
engineer Sidney M. Shapiro, an early Moses Man: 
 
 Moses had restricted the use of state parks by poor and lower-middle-class 
families, by limiting access to the parks by rapid transit; he had vetoed the 
Long Island Rail Road’s proposed construction of a branch spur to Jones Beach 
for this reason.  Now he began to limit access by buses; he instructed Shapiro 
(one of his engineers) to build a bridge across his new parkways low - too low 
for buses to pass.25 
 
By way of substantiation, Caro also quotes Lee E. Koppelman, a regional planner on 
Long Island.  Koppelman, he says, told him (almost half a century after the event): 
 
 ... ‘I was coming up to one bridge across the parkway’, he would recall, ‘and 
just as I was about to go under it, I noticed how low it seemed to be.  I took a 
good look at the next bridge, and goddammit, it was low!  I pulled over and 
measured it with my arm at the curb, and I could see that it wasn’t any 
fourteen feet high.  At the next exit, I got off and found a store and bought a 
yardstick and got back on the parkway and measured the next bridge.  At the 
curb it was eleven feet high.  And I didn’t have to go and measure all the other 
bridges.  I knew right then what I was going to find.  I knew right then what 
the old son of a gun had done.  He had built the bridges so low that buses 
couldn’t use the parkways!’.26 
 
On these two conversations rest Caro’s (and therefore Winner’s) story.  As far as I can 
judge, there exist no other (and, especially, earlier) sources for Moses’ intention to 
keep poor and black people away, with the durable assistance of the low bridges, 
from Jones Beach.  One might as well assume that such a source never existed.27 
 
 Caro’s book was published in 1974, and quickly became enormously 
influential.  It appears to be a painstakingly documented study.  Caro also presents it, 
not so much as a personalizing life history, but as a study on power: ‘the great forces 
                                                 
22  ‘Jesus uses the form to illustrate his message to his followers by telling a fictitious story 
that is nevertheless true-to-life’: Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 9 (1990), 133. 
23  Caro, op. cit. note 20. 
24  ‘... Moses began to limit access by buses; he instructed Shapiro (one of his engineers) to 
build the bridge across his new parkways low - too low for buses to pass’: Caro, ibid., 318. 
25  Ibid., 318. 
26  Ibid., 951. 
27  See, however, Bernward Joerges, ‘Expertise Lost: An Early Case of Technology 
Assessment’, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 24, No. 1 (February 1994), 96-104, on the 
vicissitudes of this kind of statement ... 
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that shaped the times in which (Moses’) subjects lived, particularly the political 
power’.28  However, if one believes more recent research on Moses, the book hardly 
satisfies standard historiographical criteria.  Kenneth Jackson, Columbia historian and 
editor of a monumental New York encyclopaedia, told us that he sent a few 
generations of his students to research particular themes and episodes in Caro’s 
biography, and that many appear to be doubtful or tendentious.29 
 
How It Really Was30 
 
Caro’s and Winner’s versions have been interpreted by most readers as implying two 
premises.  First, that one had to use the Long Island parkways to reach the beaches; 
that Moses established a physical point de passage obligatoire.31  Second, that Moses 
pursued racist politics.  As to the first claim, at the time of the parkway building 
(beginning 1924), Long Island was already considerably well developed in terms of 
transport.  The Manhattan-Long Island railway operated since 1877, and a rather 
dense system of ordinary roads was in place, parallel and across the parkways.  The 
Long Island Expressway, a true Autobahn intended to relieve traffic congestion on the 
Island, was built by Moses alongside the Parkways.32  Moses’ building activities were 
                                                 
28  Robert Caro, quoted from the introduction to Johann P. Krieg (ed,), Robert Moses: Single-
minded Genius (New York: Heart of the Lakes Publishing, 1989), 14.  Moses obviously did 
not like the biography of ‘Caro, the snooper’, as he wrote in an unpublished, outraged and 
bitter comment on a profile (condensed chapters of the biography) in The New Yorker on the 
occasion of the book’s publication by Knopf: Robert Moses, ‘Comment on a New Yorker 
Profile and Biography’ (typescript, 26 August 1974, 23pp., courtesy of Arnold H. Vollmer).  
Recently, Robert Caro has strongly confirmed his judgement of Moses, and added a little 
saga of personal persecution by Moses after publication of The Power Broker: Robert Caro, 
‘The City-Shaper’, The New Yorker (5 January 1998), 38-50. 
29  Kenneth T. Jackson, interview (Columbia University, NY, 13 November 1996).  See also 
K.T. Jackson, ‘Robert Moses and the Planned Environment: A Re-evaluation’, in Krieg 
(ed.), op. cit. note 28, 21-30. 
30  This is, as latter-day relativists will fondly quote (wrongly of course, or rather: adapted to 
their purposes) what the Prussian Leopold van Ranke required historians to find out.  In 
fact, Ranke said: ‘...wie es eigentlich gewesen’.  Translating ‘eigentlich’ as ‘really’, and putting 
the emphasis on ‘eigentlich’ instead of ‘gewesen’ (or ‘was’), mistakenly places the quote in a 
relativism/realism context.  But Ranke’s intention was not to oppose a ‘true’ history to 
many other, ‘alternative’ histories: his appeal to historians was not to pronounce 
judgement.  ‘History has been ascribed the office to judge the past and to teach the 
contemporary world for the benefit of future times: such high offices are outside the scope 
of my present attempt: it only wants show how it actually was’: Leopold von Ranke, 
Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494-1514, Sämtliche Werke, Vol. 33 
(Leipzig, 1855), viii, quoted from Friedrich Jaeger and Jörn Rüsen, Geschichte des Historismus 
(München: Beck, 1992), 45. 
31  Bruno Latour, ‘Give Me a Laboratory and I will Raise the World’, in Karin Knorr Cetina 
and Michael Mulkay (eds), Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science 
(London: Sage, 1982), 141-70.  This is of course another case of Chinese Whispers, where 
Latour uses (some would say abuses) notions introduced by Foucault and Serres with 
considerably different meanings, much as I do here with Latour’s own meaning of the 
concept. 
32  The railroad was much frequented, although at high prices: see Vincent F. Seyfried, The 
Long Island Railroad, Part 1, The South Side Railroad (Port Washington, NY: I.J. Friedman, 
1961), 154; on Moses’ dealings with the railroad, see also Cleveland Rodgers, Robert Moses: 
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premised on comprehensive regional master plans.  These sometimes would constrain 
a particular pet project of his; but sometimes he would be able to veto other interests - 
for instance, building a branch line of the Long Island railway to his beloved Jones 
Beach.  Again, this particular action is interpreted by Caro (and others) as indicating 
his class bias and racism, but not everybody need (or will) follow these 
interpretations. 
 
 In the times of the young Moses, large parts of Long Island were in the hands 
of the ‘robber barons’, the rich money aristocracy of New York,33 whose quasi-feudal 
life-style combined with an unchecked industrial capitalism.  Of course, one must 
never forget that Moses was a big player in city and regional development planning, 
both on account of his strong visions, and of his ingenious entrepreneurial and 
organizational schemes.  As to his overall concept for Long Island, he believed that 
the private property development and commercialization made possible by the 
railroad and the road system destroyed the paradise he had discovered since he went 
with his young family to Babylon (on Long Island) in the early 1920s.  He dreamed up 
his parkways to preserve what could be preserved, and to submit the Island to 
benevolent state control by building and controlling parks.34 
 
 Today, New York historians quibble over whether Moses, with his parks and 
parkways (built in part on land appropriated from the barons),35 prevented the 
ultimate commercialization, industrialization and ecological destruction of Long 
Island, thereby saving what could still be saved, or whether he entered into all kinds 
of unholy alliances with the robber barons and thereby furthered the sell-out of the 
commons.36  The fact remains that blacks could gain physical access to Long Island 
beaches via many routes.  And yet Jones Beach remained a white strand.  Even today, 
when many more blacks drive cars, and when no politician tries to exclude them from 
the beaches, not many poor blacks seem to gather on Jones Beach.37  There existed 
then, and there exist today, many reasons for black families to go elsewhere.38  It 
                                                                                                                                                          
Builder for Democracy (New York: Holt, 1952), 281-87; for a re-evaluation of Moses’ rôle in 
the transformation of Long Island, see Mollie Keller, ‘The Best Laid Plans: Robert Moses 
and the Making of Metroland’, in Krieg (ed.), op. cit. note 28, 203-12. 
33  Scott Fitzgerald’s novel, The Great Gatsby, plays on Long Island. 
34  See John A. Black, ‘Robert Moses: Long Island’s First Environmentalist’, in Krieg (ed.), op. 
cit. note 28, 141-50. 
35  John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch endorse the view that ‘Commissioner Moses was 
able to overcome opposition to his vast highway and bridge building in the New York City 
area in part because the region’s politicians were themselves buying up land adjacent to 
parkway exits, setting themselves up for huge rent gains’: J.R. Logan and H.L. Molotch, 
‘The City as a Growth Machine’, in Susan Fainstein and Scott Campbell (eds), Readings in 
Urban Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 291-337, at 304. 
36  Robert Fitch, in his The Assassination of New York (New York: Verso, 1996), 59, traces 
problems of lack of public access, not to Moses himself, but rather to the Regional Plan 
Association’s 1929 plan for New York and its corporate backers: ‘just about every highway 
and bridge credited to Robert Moses was conceived and planned by the RPA.  Moses 
simply poured the concrete on the dotted lines indicated in the plan’. 
37  Not having undertaken any primary surveys myself, I rely here on possibly impressionistic 
findings passed on to me by correspondents. 
38  Moses was obviously aware of this.  As late as 1951, he wrote in a report to Mayor 
Impellitteri: ‘... the present 80-cent one-way fare is certainly a major deterrent to 
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seems to me that, all in all, Moses could not build the relations he wanted to build into 
his parkways - whatever they were - and that he could not arrest the development he 
wanted to prevent. 
 
 Was Moses, himself a thoroughly assimilated son of German-Jewish 
immigrants educated at Yale, Oxford and Columbia, a racist?  Although, as it will 
turn out, it does not matter much whether he was or not, without doubt he was, 
subjectively (like practically every member of the East-coast establishment), what one 
might call a ‘structural racist’.  He supported and implemented policies he took to be 
liberal, reformist and above all progressive - policies, nevertheless, which left existing 
race and class relations unaffected, and which ignored that a booming economy up to 
the depression was apt to reinforce them.  But he never pursued explicitly racist 
schemes.  Instead, throughout his life he expounded an uncompromising meritocratic 
philosophy, not the least in running his many bureaucratic schemes.  As a young man 
he was fired from the city administration for an attempt to enforce strict professional 
standards for public employees.  Later in life he was known for his increasing 
intolerance towards the lifestyles and work-ethics of members of certain minority 
groups.39 
 
 And so the low bridges have lost much of their explanatory power: how, then, 
should one understand that Moses built some 200 overpasses so low?  US civil 
engineers with whom I have corresponded regularly produce two simple 
explanations for the rationality of the low-hanging bridges: that commercial traffic 
was excluded from the parkways anyway; and that the generally good transport 
situation on Long Island forbade the very considerable cost of raising the bridges.  In 
other words, Caro and Winner don’t know what they are talking about. 
 
 But, of course, one knows that engineering discourses, especially, must also be 
scrutinized very carefully.  I will therefore construct an auxiliary argument which 
could still justify the story of the bridges.  Moses’ reputation as ‘killer of New York’ 
does not result from his deeds or misdeeds on Long Island, or at least not in the first 
place.  It comes from his merciless adaptation of New York to the requirements of the 
automobile.40  To accommodate the cars, he sacrificed many functioning 
                                                                                                                                                          
widespread use of these unexcelled beach and recreation facilities and effectively drives 
more low-income families to Coney Island, which is badly overcrowded’: Robert Moses, 
Public Works: A Dangerous Trade (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), 325. 
39  George DeWan quotes Caro as quoting a private communication by Shapiro about what 
his old friend Frances Perkins once told him about Moses: ‘He doesn’t love the people ... It 
used to shock me because he was doing all these things for the welfare of the people ... 
He’d denounce the common people terribly.  To him they were lousy, dirty people, 
throwing bottles all over Jones Beach ... He loves the public, but not as people.’ (George 
DeWan, The Master Builder: How Planner Robert Moses Transformed Long Island for the 20th 
Century and Beyond, http://www.lihistory.com/7/hs722a.htm [3 August 1998], 8.)  
40  Robert Moses’ many large bridges must be mentioned here, if only in passing.  Moses built 
most of the giant bridges that link Manhattan with the other boroughs, and the rest of the 
country.  In particular, the gigantic project of the Triborough Bridge (which is, in fact, four 
bridges connected by an intricate system of approaches) literally belonged to Moses.  With 
the toll money from the Triborough bridges, he financed, in a rolling scheme, a good part 
of his rebuilding of New York, and thus effectively evaded control by the elected 
representatives of the city and its citizens. 
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neighbourhoods, as impressively described by Lewis Mumford, Marshall Berman, 
Jane Jacobs and many others.41  In other words, Moses may not have built the small 
bridges with discriminatory intent, and the bridges may be innocent of the missing 
black element on Jones Beach.  But se non e vero é ben’ trovato.  It could well have been 
so, and proof abounds that he has done worse.  He was an undemocratic scoundrel all 
right.42 
 
 Michael Ignatieff has called Jeremy Bentham’s ‘Panopticon-prison’ - the classic 
parable for the social effects of a building technology - a ‘symbolic caricature of many 
characteristic features of disciplinary thinking in his age’s thinking’.43  Are not the low 
bridges, even if they have not been built in the way depicted in the literature, a perfect 
symbol for Moses’ and his governing contemporaries’ politics?  And would that not 
be excuse enough for Caro and Winner (and many others) to draw the symbolic 
caricature of the low overpasses?  We could talk about this.  But as it happens, in the 
1980s there was an interesting turn in this matter, too.  A new, revisionist city history 
of New York has retouched the cruel Moses picture.  Today, many historians of New 
York do not see in him a ‘Count Dracula of City Planning’,44 but rather a truly 
remarkable representative of the species ‘political entrepreneur’ - at times even 
‘benevolent early ecologist and conservationist’.45  For some readers, Winner’s low 
bridges may look, all things considered, rather like the caricature of a symbol than a 
symbolic caricature of the ‘Moses way of thinking’ about the metropolis. 
 
 But there is more.  In Caro and Winner there is a suggestion that Moses has 
violated a valid standard of bridge-building, a tacit or explicit norm which elsewhere 
allowed buses and other high vehicles on such roads.  Moses - so the implication goes 
- deviated intentionally and self-importantly from such a norm.  But this, it seems, 
was not the case.  In the USA, trucks, buses and other commercial vehicles were 
                                                 
41  Marshall Berman, All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1983); Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: 
Random House, 1961); see also the section devoted to Moses in Eugene Lewis, Public 
Entrepreneurship: Toward a Theory of Bureaucratic Political Power (Bloomington, IN & London: 
Indiana University Press, 1980), 156-228; and Joel Schwartz, The New York Approach: Robert 
Moses, Urban Liberals, and Redevelopment of the Inner City (Columbus, OH: Ohio State 
University Press, 1993), passim. 
42  Moses prided himself, above all, as a man of action.  His famous adage, ‘Those who can, 
build - those who can’t, criticize!’, thrown in the general direction of urban and technology 
studies but aimed very specifically at Lewis Mumford, finds a peculiar echo in Thomas and 
Agatha Hughes’ (otherwise celebratory) appraisal of Mumford’s rôle (in connection with 
Moses’ United Nations Headquarters): ‘In proposing destruction in the name of 
organicism, Mumford offers a brutal bulldozer urbanism little better than that of Le 
Corbusier or Robert Moses, whose urban ideas he so despised’: T.P. Hughes and A.G. 
Hughes, Lewis Mumford: Public Intellectual (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990), 281. 
43  In Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 
1750-1850 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), quoted from Anne Crowther, ‘Penal 
Peepshow: Bentham’s Prison that Never Was’, Times Literary Supplement (23 February 
1996), 4-5.  See also note 58, below. 
44  As Random House editor Jason Epstein still calls him recently: see J. Epstein, ‘Metropolitan 
Life: The Encyclopedia of New York’, New York Review of Books (16 November 1995), 4-6. 
45  See Black, op. cit. note 34. 
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prohibited on all parkways.46  Moses did nothing different on Long Island from any 
parks commissioner in the country.  Apparently, in those days, there was just one 
exception to this rule: only on Memorial Parkway, leading from Washington, DC, to 
the Washington monument on Mount Vernon, could buses run - but only after 
protracted and heated debates.  The bus-lobby won out in the end, arguing that the 
parkway was built on the trail of a horse-drawn trolley bus.  Many tourist-pilgrims 
arriving in Washington by rail or plane depended on public transport to reach the 
goal of their journey - the national shrine on Mount Vernon.  In sum: Moses could 
hardly have let buses on his parkways, even if he had wanted differently. 
 
A Nature for the Big City 
 
A small detail could be the key to another interpretation, turning Winner’s design 
argument from its head and on to its feet.  True the bridges were low, but each had to 
be low differently.  Moses took great care that each and every bridge was individually 
fitted into its natural context: standardized unicity, as it were, was part of an artfully 
laid out nature.  One can show more generally that, when it came to parkway 
building, bridge-building culture was connected to a specific politics of nature.  
Maybe one should take a much closer look at Moses the aesthete and nature 
politician, because he invested a good part of his considerable local power and 
organizational ingenuity in his project to realize, through the park and beach 
schemes, his vision of a national nature/culture - and, in particular, to bring it to its 
apotheosis on Jones Beach. 
 
 In short: the low overpasses represent a national heritage, a deep institutional 
structure in the national building culture in which technological standards combined 
with many non-technical ones.  Moses stood for the progressive variant of a national 
park code which was part of mainstream American culture.  Simon Schama has 
impressively described this culture and its politics in his book, Landscape and 
                                                 
46  To quote one of my correspondents who studies American scenic roads (Timothy Davis, 
personal communication, 28 February 1995): ‘The prohibition of commercial traffic is one of 
the defining characteristics of parkways as a specific type of road.  Of course there are 
similar roads which are open to all kinds of traffic.  They are called highways or freeways 
... a term coined around 1930 to denote parkway-type roads with free access for all types of 
vehicles.’ Davis’ letter then goes on to say that the prohibition of commercial traffic from 
parkways dates back to the 19th century: ‘It reflects the fact that parkways were originally 
conceived as elongated parks with recreational drives through them, not as general 
purpose transportation arteries.  19th-century American parkroads and parkways were 
designed for use by light carriages and buggies.  They excluded heavy wagons and 
commercial teaming, and only rarely allowed horse-drawn sightseeing omnibuses.  These 
uses were considered detrimental to the road surfaces and incompatible with the essential 
purpose of parks, which were supposed to serve as a retreat from the hustle, bustle and 
commercial activity of the modern city.  It was natural to continue these prohibitions to 
motor vehicles, especially since early motor trucks and omnibuses were extremely slow 
and unwieldy, and would certainly have dominated the park landscape and interfered 
with motorists’ pleasure.  Automobiles were initially a plaything of the wealthy but - in 
America at least - cheap new and second-hand cars were available to working classes by 
the 1920s when Robert Moses began building his parkways.  It has been argued that the 
spread of automobile ownership in the 1920s made parkways and recreational driving 
vastly more democratic than they had been in the horse-and-carriage era.’ 
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Memory.47  The social basis of these politics was twofold: reformist, liberal-
paternalistic élites on the supply side; upwardly mobile, automobile middle classes on 
the demand side - ‘upward’ in the new automobiles, the incarnation of the American 
dream of mass production, mass consumption, mass culture.  And ‘mass’ must always 
be read as ‘democratic’, too.48 
 
 Moses created environments for the automobile society and what it 
represented.  He invented and implemented standards for both - the autogerechte 
metropolis and its apparent opposite, nature.  He saw the two as belonging together.  
He put them together.  In my reading, it is this programme of the melioration and 
beautification of the giant city which Moses’ low bridges caricature symbolically.  
Better, however, his large bridges, because they symbolize and perform the transition 
between the big city, which Moses loved and cherished, and the city-nature he 
invented.  In an inverted sense, then, Winner has a point in looking for political 
programmes in the technologies of the time.  At issue is an extended structure, the 
production of a new-old nature for a new metropolitan culture.49  Winner, however, 
turns to Robert Moses as the power-seeking anti-democratic scapegoat for the crimes 
of this culture, allowing a generation of social scientists and city planners after Moses 
to unload the latent guilt of being part of its hidden agendas.50 
                                                 
47  Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1995); see also Roderick 
Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967); 
Brester Snow (ed.), The Highway and the Landscape (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1959); Christopher Tunnard and Boris Pushkarev, Man-made America: Chaos or 
Control? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963).  For an account of competing 
American Parkway ideologies, see Gilmore Clarke, ‘The Parkway Idea’, in Snow (ed.), The 
Highway and the Landscape, op. cit., 32-55.  Moses stood for one of the two main schools of 
National Park and Parkway development: an innovative concept, ‘pro-urban’, using 
modern means of production and regulation, as opposed to a more localist-folklorist, 
anti-urban tradition. - I cannot resist here a quotation from Moses’ outraged and quite 
unpublishable response to Caro’s New Yorker profile (Moses, op. cit. note 28, 21ff., my 
emphasis).  After an aside on Caro’s expertise in matters of public works... (‘Caro’s 
engineering and transportation outgivings are ridiculously amateurish, naive and infantile. 
 He picked them up from a disgruntled young engineer with the City Planning 
Commission who indulged in nasty recriminations after he left ... the Commission’) ... he 
confesses to a revealing affinity: ‘In this context I always tip my hat to my cousin Frank 
Lloyd Wright.  In his wilder projects of Welsh fantasy he really believed his own 
architectural interruptions of nature lifted us to the hills whence cometh our light, enhanced 
the plains and swept us out to the limitless seas.  Frank’s comparison of himself as a 
skylark and to me as a blind night crawler were of course just a quaint bit of Celtic 
humour.  We take these things from the Frank Lloyd Wrights because we admire them in 
spite of their idiosyncrasies.’ 
48  Except, arguably, for mass transit, although Moses also fought for the modernization of the 
railroads: see Rodgers, op. cit. note 32. 
49  It seems that Moses was highly conscious of this.  Former Moses engineer Shapiro 
impressively (and affirmatively) pays witness to this when he tells Caro of Moses’ grim 
determination to hold fast to his vision even when, in the 1960s, his Long Island Parkways 
had mutated into one of the world’s most frequented and congested Highways.  Long after 
his dream of linking the metropolitan Moloch to a redeeming nature had turned into a 
nightmare, did he enjoy the thought that his bridges may indeed have public transport 
blocked off from this nature for decades after his death? (see Caro, op. cit. note 20, 953). 
50  It has been said many times, of course, that American public transportation systems are 
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The Seductive Power of Parables 
 
Back to Chinese Whispers.  What is it with parables like Winner’s version of the 
Moses story?  Why has the low-bridges example been taken up by so many authors?  
Why did it become such a splendid piece of ready-made discourse - a ‘discoursette’, 
as it were?  Why was it so wonderfully suited for further use in many other (in 
themselves quite different) texts in the social study of technology and of the city? 
 
 In an often quoted (but usually unreferenced) sentence, Victor Hugo is alleged 
to have said: ‘Greater than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come’ 
(Histoire d’un Crime, 1852).51  I will now adapt this adage for my own purposes, and 
say: ‘Greater than the mightiest idea is a story well told’.  Winner’s Moses example is 
so winning because in itself it is a particularly well constructed artifact, capable of 
serving a great number of rhetorical purposes.  The form of the parable is so seductive 
because it lends itself to several things: it leaves room for multiple interpretations, yet 
it preserves concrete, ostensibly historical reference; and it offers in a nutshell a 
far-reaching, causally formulated theory of technology well in tune with healthy 
                                                                                                                                                          
shaped by a hidden (or not so hidden) agenda to discriminate bus-routes and railways.  
Says Robert Fitch (op. cit. note 36, 72), concerning the Long Island Expressway: ‘A 
principal RPA imperative - keeping lower-income workers at a safe distance from upper-
income businessmen - also goes far to explain why ... no provisions for mass transit were 
ever made, an outcome which Caro blames squarely on Moses.’ - To be fair, Winner 
acknowledges (op. cit. note 2, 125ff.) that... ‘... most important examples of technologies 
that have political consequences are those that transcend the simple categories of 
‘intended’ and ‘unintended’ altogether... Rather, one must say that the technological deck 
has been stacked long in advance to favor certain social interests, and that some people 
were bound to receive a better hand than others.’ (See also his Chapter on ‘Decentralization 
Clarified’, in The Whale and the Reactor, op. cit. note 9, where Winner returns to the Moses 
case.)  But it is his examples for the design-version, which he himself refers to as ‘almost 
conspirational’, that have made themselves a career in social studies of technology. 
51  [Editor’s note]  This quotation is the subject of a lengthy annotation in the Appendix to 
Burton Stevenson’s monumental Stevenson’s Book of Quotations (London: Cassell, 8th edn, 
n.d.), 2298.  It is given there as: ‘One can resist the invasion of armies, but not the invasion 
of ideas’, and cited as: Victor Hugo, Histoire d’un Crime: Conclusion: La Chute, Ch. 10, p. 649 
(Édition Nationale, Paris, 1983), Vol.36.  However, it is noted that ‘this sentence has been 
variously translated’.  Later, the editor writes: ‘And on April 15, 1943, The Nation sent out a 
subscription circular with the sentence, „There is one thing stronger than all the armies in 
the world; and that is an idea whose time has come“, stating that this was the closing entry 
in Victor Hugo’s diary, who died the same night in his sleep.  A talk to the circulation 
manager responsible for the circular elicited the information that, while he remembered 
using the quotation, he had no idea of its source or where he found it.  A search by the 
Information Division of the New York Public Library disclosed no trace of any publication 
of Victor Hugo resembling a diary or journal.  A similar search by the reference department 
of the Library of Congress was also unavailing, but the sentence from Histoire d’un Crime 
given above was found, and is probably the origin of the sentence quoted by The Nation, 
which has since become familiar in a more picturesque form, „Greater than the tread of 
mighty armies is an idea whose hour has come“’. - It seems as if this quotation has had a 
‘career’ similar to the parable of Moses’ low bridges!  We hope that this will be a warning 
to all contributing scholars: writing footnotes is much more rewarding than writing 
Editorials. [DE] 
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common-sense.  Enormous interpretive flexibility, unambiguous empirical reference, 
elegant theoretical formula.  And all that coupled with an urgent political-moral 
message.  Not bad.  One might say, with the historian Haydon White - or, still further 
back in this particular Chinese Whispers, with Aristotle - that Winner’s story is so 
masterful because it combines all major rhetorical tropes: metaphor, metonymy, 
synecdoche - except for irony. 
 
 Artifacts may then, in Winner’s sense, have politics: but surely politics have 
artifacts - well-built parables like Winner’s. 
 
 Winner’s knowledge-politics seem to be concerned with how to build power 
relations with things: at least, this is how most students read him.  He does not (like, 
for instance, Woolgar) seem concerned with the performative power of words.  
‘Seem’, I say, because in the end he is only concerned with the latter, notably: how one 
can achieve a definitive effect with words, how one can persuade and morally 
convince readers.  How to do words with things.  A while ago, he told me in 
conversation about the Moses article: 
 
 I am not interested in theories, I am interested in moral issues.  My point is not 
explanatory, it is about political choices.52 
 
But Winner may turn any which way: he also offers, in this and in other texts, 
explanations for use in sociologies of technology or planning.  He insinuates that with 
the help of building and other technologies one can predetermine effects, make them 
durable, without being there: real effects, which cannot be interpreted away and 
which cannot be reduced to some symbolic characteristics of particular technologies.  
Technologies, he says, have calculable characteristics of which to say they are ‘open to 
interpretation’ would be lofty, even immoral.  The Moses story does not illustrate 
such theories well, but Winner has told his story splendidly.  His parable has taken 
hold in the heads of some generations of students of scholars in (that is, students of) 
technology studies, who use it variously (without further ado by Winner) in teaching 
and research, as teaching thing and thinking thing.  More effective, however, as 
teaching thing: the parable seems to possess a mighty didactic potential, precisely 
because it is presented as a thing to think with, a suggestive theoretical miniature. 
 
 Max Weber’s lecture on science as a profession - another case of Chinese 
Whispers from which generations of sociology students took their packaged version 
of ‘value-free science’ - has something to say here.53  In this lecture, Weber warns that 
such parables loaded with value judgements may be effective, but they should be 
avoided in science (though not in politics): they must not be used to seduce the 
innocent (that is, the students, the not-yet-initiated).  They are good mostly for the 
wise, those who already know.54  And here this Comment could end, with the moral 
                                                 
52  Winner, interview, loc. cit. note 10. 
53  Max Weber, ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf’, in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre 
(Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, UTB [1919], 1988), 582-613; in English: ‘Science as Vocation’, in 
Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber: Social Essays (London & 
Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), 129-56. 
54  See once more the Encyclopedia Britannica: ‘Parables can often be understood only by an 
informed élite, who can discern the meaning within the brief, enigmatic structures’ (op. cit. 
 
 
16 
that such parables, the artifacts of politics, of which there are many in the social 
sciences, should always be handled with care.55  But this would be too easy.  Two 
objections might be briefly addressed, lest I am told by reviewers that my analysis 
begs the question.  One has to do with my treatment of Langdon Winner.  The other 
has to do with what is the ‘real’ relationship between technologies and social effects, if 
it is not as Winner claims in his strong, design-version.  Let me now take these in turn. 
 
The Two Cs 
 
Langdon Winner must not be scapegoated in the way I have suggested he has 
scapegoated Robert Moses.  He should not be made to carry the anguish and guilt of a 
generation of social scientists trying to find a new way to look at the moral and 
analytical issues of technological change.  Even if I feel that he has a politics of 
knowledge I cannot share, he represents, much as Moses did, a cultural structure - 
namely, a particular tradition and a powerful discourse in the social sciences.  One 
should look in turn for the historical and cultural roots of this discourse, and make an 
attempt to situate it in terms of a sociology of the sciences.  In particular: what are the 
ideological rôles the parables and representations of this discourse play in 
legitimating the practice of the many professions concerned with the design and 
planning of human environments - that is, most scientific experts? 
 
 Theories of social change can be divided, in an heroic simplification, between 
the two grand discourses of control and contingency.  In control theories (comprising, 
in particular, all theories of planned change), social order and disorder are presented 
as a result of intentional action.  The rest is written off under rubrics such as 
‘unintended side effects’ of action.  The great models in this tradition are classical 
political theory, institutional theory, and early cybernetics.  Design theories and 
bridge parables like Winner’s seem to me to belong to the discourse of control.  In its 
apparently opposite variants of theory of power (Herrschaftstheorie) and theory of 
planning, it had its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s.56 
 
 At the other extreme, approaches like Woolgar’s, and most radical 
constructivist or deconstructivist programmes,57 belong with a counter-discourse of 
                                                                                                                                                          
note 22, 133). 
55  Another example which may interest authors who were won over by Winner’s narrative, is 
- on a slightly different scale - the story of Tokugawa Japan’s intentional reversion from an 
advanced military technology (firearms) to a more primitive one (the samurai swords), as 
told (for instance) by Noel Perrin, in his Giving up the Gun: Japan’s Reversion to the Sword, 
1543-1879 (Boston, MA: Godine, 1979).  According to Conrad Totman’s review of Perrin’s 
book, this tale does not stand up to historiographic evidence for both motivations and 
outcomes: it seems this was neither intended, nor did it happen: see Journal of Asian Studies, 
Vol. 39, No. 3 (May 1980), 599-601. 
56  Recently, Richard Rorty has veritably demolished the US-American intellectual left since 
the 1960s, accusing them of academic abstractions, and of being incapable of pragmatic 
reform: see R. Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Politics in Twentieth-Century America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).  This is how I read Winner’s technology 
theory too: see, especially, Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control 
as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1977). 
57  See Stephen H. Kellert, ‘Science and Literature and Philosophy’, Configurations, Vol. 4, No. 
2 (Spring 1996), 215-32. 
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contingency which has flourished since the 1970s and 1980s.  In contingency theories, 
one might say, social disorder and order are not seen as the product of planful, 
intentional action, but as the result of a conjunction of consequences of action.  
‘Consequences of’ by all means ‘intentional’, but in principle of the ‘blind’ (that is, not 
guided by some overall design) actions of many small actors adapting to the 
circumstances at hand.  The great models are: evolutionary theory, chaos theory, and 
theories of self-organization. 
 
 The classic architectural parable of control theories of social change is Jeremy 
Bentham’s Panopticon, which has advanced to a mighty thing to think with in grand 
social theory (at least since Foucault). 
 
 Morals reformed - health preserved - industry invigorated - instruction 
diffused - public burthens lightened - Economy seated, as it were, upon a rock - 
the gordian knot of the Poor-Laws are not cut, but untied - all by a simple idea 
in Architecture! ... Such is the engine: such the work that may be done with it. 
 
These are the introductory lines in Bentham’s famous Panopticon Letters, in which he 
designed his version of a perpetuum mobile of societal control via architecture.58  The 
basic idea of these lines informs Winner’s programme too: one could give the social 
process definitive form by making use of certain building technologies.  There is, of 
course, a difference: Bentham presented a proposal which was never actually built, 
that is to say, tested empirically.59  The low bridges have been built, and found quite 
innocent.  However, to achieve its astonishing effect in the literature, Winner’s story 
had also to be told counterfactually, even if it seems ‘true to life’.  If one looks for a 
classic architectural parable of contingency theories of social change, the Tower of 
Babel comes to mind.  In what I call the LogIcon of the Babel Tower,60 the multicultural 
babble of countless actors represents an uncontrollable and infinite (‘contingent’) 
process of coincidental action effects.  The true story of the bridges plays somewhere 
between the grand discourses of control and contingency.  But up to now, 
theoreticians of control have appropriated it. 
 
Authorizing Bridges 
 
The second objection could be that all of the above does not present any substantive 
alternative to Winner’s view concerning the relationship of built environment and 
social process.  On the one hand, it might be argued that - while the low bridges may 
                                                 
58  Jeremy Bentham, ‘Panopticon; or, the Inspection-House: Containing the idea of a new 
principle of construction applicable to any sort of establishment, in which persons of any 
description are to be kept under inspection ... with a Plan of Management adapted to the 
Principle...’ (written in London, 1787): see Jeremy Bentham (ed. Miran Bozovic), The 
Panopticon and other Prison Writings (New York: Verso, 1995). 
59  Although many prison buildings to this day look similar to Bentham’s original device (if 
not its details), only two prison buildings which somehow corresponded to Bentham’s 
plans seem to have been built eventually - one in Illinois and one in Cuba (where - talking 
about disciplinary effects - Fidel Castro wrote his famous speech ‘History Will Absolve 
Me’): see John Ryle, ‘The Panopticon’, Letter to the Editor, Times Literary Supplement (1 
March 1996), 17. 
60  I use the term ‘LogIcons’ as shorthand for ‘pictures to think with’ - that is, visual 
representations in science (and in other technical activities). 
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not have fulfilled the control tasks ascribed to them by Moses or Winner - there are 
ample other examples of social control through buildings and other engines.  
Evidently this is not the place to go into this matter in any detail.  However, it must be 
said that not only did Moses’ overpasses not control much, but that similar non-effects 
of intentional control via building can be demonstrated for almost any randomly 
chosen physical set-up.61  How then should one construe the subtle but theoretically 
entrenched relationships between built form and its social contents - this particular 
variant of the ‘relation between things and words’?  It would be cheap to say: one 
cannot go behind the discourses; bridges do what they are discursively ascribed to do, 
and the most powerful discourse decides what is fact. 
 
 One alternative to control approaches - closer to the discourse of contingency - 
would be to decipher the effect of technical (in particular, building) artifacts primarily 
via their expressive values.  Things induce nothing, but they indicate something.  Built 
spaces are considered as media which tell something to those capable of reading and 
listening.  Like all texts, everyone may read them differently: buildings must and can 
be read anew all the time.  Authorial intentions (that is, designers’ purposes) 
sometimes play a rôle in this, but usually a peculiarly indeterminate one.  In a highly 
contingent process, many many others will decide over and over again which 
meanings and uses are inscribed into built spaces. 
 
 On this road one arrives at a completely different sociology of technology, or of 
city space, than the usual one cued to planning and melioration: namely, a sociology 
of space/technosymbolism/aesthetics, of taste and fashion, of the ritual mis-en-scène 
of professional design and designers - planners, architects, politicians and 
propagandists.  Other themes current in social studies of technology and the city are 
difficult to discuss in such frameworks: for example, the production of inclusion and 
exclusion in big cities; the failure of municipal regimes; the robbing of power from 
legitimate communal agencies by mostly distant world corporations incapable of 
implantation in local political cultures; and so on and so forth.  One might then wish 
to look for a middle road between the two Cs of contingency and control, between 
instrumentation and unpredictable adaptation. 
 
 It seems to me that this would mean treating things - bridges, roads, buildings 
and such - as phenomena ‘in the middle’ or, to use a currently fashionable term, 
‘boundary objects’.  Conceiving of built spaces and other technical installations as 
boundary objects avoids preconceived notions of control or contingency.  Attention is 
then directed to the ways in which they serve as media of mediation, negotiation and 
translation between the reciprocal expectations and requirements of many people or 
organizations (and especially of those who represent them, who are authorized to 
speak for them).  One looks for the continuous re-institutionalizations, the changes in 
the legitimate, taken-for-granted and at times irremovable rules regarding rights to 
                                                 
61  It is peculiarly difficult to give specific examples for this position.  I sometimes name 
alleged inherent social-control effects of concrete high-rise buildings, or of so-called fascist 
architecture, only to open up long debates, because it is so commonsensical to account for 
things in terms of inherent social qualities and to classify them accordingly: see also 
Bernward Joerges, Gebaute Umwelt und Verhalten: über das Verhältnis von 
Technikwissenschaften und Sozialwissenschaften am Beispiel der Architektur- und der 
Verhaltenstheorie (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1979). 
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use and actual uses taking place over the lifetime of things. 
 
 In this perspective, to put it very briefly, the bridges represent legitimate or 
contested property and access rights which as a rule change over time.  The practices 
of the bridges, their factual symbolic and mundane uses, will always remain loosely 
and ambiguously coupled to such representations.  The institutionalization and 
ongoing re-institutionalization of bridges can be understood as resulting from the 
interplay of order imposing bridge representations and contingent bridge practices. 
 
 Things, including bridges and other built artifacts, are like words.  With his 
book How to do Things with Words, John Austin began the critique of Saussurean 
linguistic theories which distinguish an internal from an external science of language - 
a science of language, and a science of language use.62  Because here, as Bourdieu has 
put it, ‘the power of words is assumed to be only in themselves, namely there where it 
is not’.63  Similarly with things: the power represented in built and other technical 
devices is not to be found in the formal attributes of these things themselves.  Only their 
authorization, their legitimate representation, gives shape to the definitive effects they 
may have. 
 
 In particular, built spaces always represent control rights.  They belong to 
someone and not to others, they can legitimately be used by some and not by others.  
Variable control rights over built spaces constrain what can pass in and around these 
spaces.  Only rarely and in the most trivial senses can one show that such constraints are 
coupled to building form.  In this view, it is the processes by which authorizations are 
built, maintained, contested and changed which is at issue in any social study of built 
spaces and technology.64 
 
Note 
 
I owe thanks to many colleagues, with whom I have discussed the case of Moses’ 
bridges over the years.  Without wholly persuading them of my viewpoint, I have 
especially profited from conversations with Bettina Heintz, Heinz Bude, Sally Wyatt, 
Gerald Wagner, Johannes Hörning, Barbara Czarniawska, Reiner Grundmann and 
Richard Rottenburg.  Jasdan Joerges, although he is a biologist, has done much of the 
fieldwork. 
 
Bernward Joerges is a Senior Research Fellow at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
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62  John L. Austin, How to do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1962). 
63  Pierre Bourdieu, Ce que parler veut dire: L’économie des échanges linguistiques (Paris: Fayard, 
1982), quoting from the German edition, Was heißt Sprechen? Die Ökonomie des sprachlichen 
Austauschs (Wien: Braumüller, 1990), 73. 
64  Looking at it this way, the title of this Comment could well have been: ‘To Whom Belong 
the Bridges of Robert Moses?’; or: ‘To Whom Belong the Bridges of Robert Moses?’. 
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